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1On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement
Costs
         By
Henrik Lando1 and Caspar Rose2
Abstract: We argue that enforcement costs, ignored in the literature
on ‘efficient breach’, are important for the choice of contract breach
remedy. Empirically we find that specific performance is almost never
claimed in Civil Law countries. It involves forcing a party in breach to
perform actions while damages involves extracting only a monetary
payment. The former is more difficult and more coercive. We study
enforcement rules of Denmark, France and Germany. Enforcement of
specific performance is absent in Denmark and weak in France. In
Germany it seems stricter, which points to the importance of costs of
enforcement to the claimant.
                                                                
1 Associate professor of law and economics, Copenhagen Business School
2 Ph.D student of law and economics, Copenhagen Business School
21. Introduction
When a party to a contract does not perform his part and the contract
remedy is ‘specific performance’, the other party can insist on
performance in accordance with the contract. If the rule is ‘damages’,
the non-breaching party cannot do so; he can then only sue for
monetary compensation. The choice between specific performance and
damages is analyzed in the economic literature on  ‘efficient breach’.
According to this literature the main argument in favor of damages is
that one should not force a party to carry out a contract when, due to
changed circumstances, costs exceed benefits. The main argument in
favor of specific performance is that the judge commonly cannot
ascertain damages correctly. Often damages are set too low, reflecting
that some costs of breach are unobservable to the judge. Under the
rule of specific performance, the parties may renegotiate under the
threat of specific performance, perhaps agreeing to some monetary
compensation which will then more accurately reflect the parties’ true
valuation of performance (Ulen, 1984). Aghion-Dewatripont-Rey (1994)
show that first-best levels of reliance investments may under certain
circumstances be achieved by proper design of the renegotiation
game3. Broadly speaking, this is where the discussion stands.
                                                                
3 See also Edlin-Reichelstein (1996) and Maskin-Tirole  (1999) as well as the
literature on cooperative investments, e.g Chung and Che (1999).
3In the present article, we argue that an important aspect is missing in
this discussion, namely the cost and difficulty of ultimate
enforcement. The importance of the following question seems to have
been overlooked: When a party demands specific performance and the
court decrees it, but the breaching party still refuses to perform, what
coercive mechanism should be employed to ensure compliance? This
is a real question, as the legal history of contract breach remedies
reveals4. It turns out, that ultimate enforcement entails costs of
various, interrelated kinds. First, it is simply costly for the authorities
to implement specific performance against the will of a breaching
party. It is generally much easier for enforcement authorities (the
bailiff) to enforce a payment of damages, i.e. to make the breaching
party pay a sum of money, than it is to make him perform certain
actions. Second, while people may be coerced through (the threat) of
monetary sanctions or even incarceration, being coerced in this way
into performing certain actions is often felt to be more intrusive, than
to be forced to pay a sum of money, especially when the breaching
party does not feel that he ever agreed to perform the actions in
question.  Third, the process of enforcement including appeals may
take a long time which often significantly reduces the value to specific
performance for the non-breaching party5. We argue that the existence
                                                                
4 See Dawson (1959).
5 Not all of the postponement cost in the present system can be recovered by the
non-breaching since some of them are unverifiable.
4of these kinds of enforcement costs significantly increases the
attractiveness of damages compared with specific performance.
The ‘efficient breach’ theory differs from a theory that focuses on
enforcement costs, though the theories are complementary, in one
important respect. The former stresses that specific performance is
inferior to damages in an ex-ante sense, i.e. that the parties will prefer
damages at the contract formation stage. The latter  stresses the ex-
post perspective, that even if specific performance is the default rule,
it may not be claimed or if claimed it may not be enforced by the
authorities. Thus, it becomes of interest to see how many cases of
specific performance we can observe in Civil Law countries where
specific performance is the default rule (where the aggrieved party
may, generally speaking, choose between damages and specific
performance).
Hence, we shall start by studying case material from Civil Law
countries and what legal scholars have noted about the actual use of
specific performance in these countries. We find that specific
performance is almost never claimed in our data-set, which includes
CISG-cases as well as Danish contract cases, whenever actions need
to be performed (in contrast to cases where goods simply need to be
handed over). That specific performance is very rarely claimed in Civil
Law countries seems also to be the consensus among comparative
legal scholars.
While this provides support for the idea that enforcement of specific
performance is difficult or costly, it does not tell us whether people do
5not claim specific performance because it is not ultimately enforced by
the legal system or because the non-breaching party for other reasons
prefers to claim damages. Hence, we take a closer look at enforcement
practices in three Civil Law countries: Denmark, France and
Germany6. It turns out that enforcement of specific performance when
actions must be performed is entirely absent in Denmark and weak in
France7. Germany, on the other hand, does seem to enforce specific
performance in the cases analyzed in the economic literature where
specific reliance investments have been undertaken and substitute
performance from third parties is hence not (readily) available.  Thus,
the question whether specific performance is claimed in Germany
becomes of special interest (our data material includes some cases
adjudicated in Germany but we do not study a large sample of
German cases). Since specific performance seems to be (ultimately)
enforced in Germany, if there were only few claims for it in Germany
the reason would have to be a lack of demand for specific
performance. If, on the other hand, there were many claims for
specific performance in Germany, then this would point in the
direction that the absence in other countries of such claims is caused
by lack of enforcement on the part of their legal system. According to
our sources, the number of claims for specific performance is low also
                                                                
6 Time does not allow us to analyze other countries.
7  Cases may be found in both countries where one party is forced to deliver an
already existing good or forced not to undertake an action, such as violate a
competition clause.
6in Germany. This leads us to conclude (although only tentatively since
we are not positive that enforcement in Germany is strict when it
comes to the actual practice of the bailiff (the Gerichtsvollzieher)), that
the fundamental reason for the very limited use of specific
performance in Civil Law countries probably is the lack of demand (ex
post) for specific performance. We discuss some reasons that may lie
behind this lack of demand.
Finally, we discuss implications of our findings for the literature on
efficient breach and renegotiation design, as well as for the differences
between Civil and Common Law countries as far as breach remedies
are concerned. We end by restating our conclusions.
2. Empirical Evidence
2.1 Specific Performance in Cases Adjudicated under
CISG
The CISG was the first major international sales law accepted by a
large number of nations. CISG is now ratified by more than 55
countries around the world including leading trade nations.
2.1.1 Remedies for breach in CISG
7Article 46 (1) provides that the buyer may require performance by the
seller of his obligations. However under article 28, a court is not
bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless the court
would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale.
This means that the courts of the common law countries such as USA,
Canada, and Australia are not bound to grant specific performance.
CISG gives both the seller and the buyer the right to claim damages
instead of specific performance.
2.1.2 CISG; data and results
The data consists on an extensive case material obtained both from
the privately UNILEX database and the following databases available
on the internet; http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/database.html
and www.jura.uni.freiburg.de which contain some of the largest
collections of cases involving CISG from all over the world. The
databases include both cases decided by national courts as well as
arbitration awards. The data set contains more than 200 cases where
the question of specific performance vs. damages is present. Almost all
the  industrialized countries are represented in the data8. Of these
200 cases, only one case mentions a buyer who claimed specific
performance9.  A Russian enterprise had sold raw aluminum to a
group of buyers located in Argentina and Hungary. After the
enterprise was privatized in December 1994, the new owners stopped
delivery in February 1995 and  the case was  subsequently submitted
to arbitration in Switzerland. Concerning the buyer’s request for
specific performance the tribunal found that it had no legal support
                                                                
8 An exception is Japan that has not yet ratified the convention.
9 C.f. Zürich Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award ZHK 273/95 of 31 May 1996.
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960531s1.html
8but the reasoning of the tribunal on this point is not clear10. The
tribunal further stated that even if CISG was applied the tribunal
“fails to see how specific performance could be an appropriate remedy
for buyers in this case”. The tribunal pointed to the problems
associated with the enforcement of specific performance of contracts
in Russia for the next eight or ten years.
2.1.3 Empirical Conclusion on CISG
The conclusion is clear. Even though specific performance is a remedy
which is available in many of the CISG-cases we have studied, it is
almost never claimed and in our material literally never granted. In
very many cases, cover purchases are made and reimbursed under a
rule of expectation damages.
2.2 Specific Performance in Danish Contract Cases
Our material covers cases reported in the Danish Weekly Law Report
(Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen, hereinafter UfR) from 1950 till April 2000.
UfR contains most of the important published cases but no arbitration
awards most of which are not published. Apart from this material, we
have studied an overview by Søren Lehman Nielsen11 of Danish cases
involving specific performance in construction contracts12.
We  have found very few cases involving specific performance. In UfR
we found no published case within the last five decades where the
buyer claimed specific performance in a case concerning the sale of
                                                                
10 See reference to the case in footnote above.
11 In Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 1996.
12 Construction contract cases are published in a separate collection (called KFE).
9goods13. Lehman’s study shows, on the other hand, that there have
been a few construction contract cases where specific performance
were granted. However, as Lehman Nielsen stresses as his main point,
in all of those cases both parties to the contract preferred specific
performance to a cover transaction (p.178). The following case is an
example14: a group of entrepreneurs had agreed in a contract to repair
in a specified fashion some houses which they had built and which
suffered from defects that might in the future prove costly. After
signing the contract, the entrepreneurs realized that the cost of repair
was out of proportion to the gain. Experts confirmed in court that the
probability of future loss was very small in comparison to the expense
of repair. Still, the Supreme Court voted by 3 to 2 to grant specific
performance. This verdict could possibly have been enforced by the
foged, since he could have granted the buyers the right to contract for
a third party to do the repair. This possibility is confirmed by the fact
that the repairs actually were carried out by the entrepreneurs15; they
probably preferred this to a ‘cover purchase’. Thus, we do find some,
but not many, of the kind of cases discussed in the economic
literature where specific performance leads to a social loss in
comparison with damages by the cost of performance exceeding the
value.
We should also note that there are cases where contractual
obligations not to perform certain acts have been enforced, such as
when a person violates a competition clause by leaving a firm to work
for a competitor. In such cases the judicial enforcement agent (in
Denmark he is called the foged, similar to the bailiff in common law)
has sometimes issued an injunction. In this sense specific
performance is in some circumstances an available remedy but our
interestlies mainly not with the enforcement of duties not to act but
                                                                
13 UfR 1989.1039H.
14 It is actually published in UfR (1989, page 1039). It is the only such case in UfR.
15 Our source for this information is the parties’ lawyers.
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with the enforcement of positive duties to perform certain acts, mainly
to finish a good or to deliver a service.
2.2.1 Conclusion on Danish Data
According to the empirical material, even when specific performance is
available it is very rarely claimed. The number of cases involving
specific performance is very limited; however, in construction
contracts specific performance has been granted by arbitrators in
some cases but only where both parties have preferred that remedy to
damages.
3. Enforcement Systems in Three Civil Law Countries
The very limited use of specific performance in Civil Law countries
might conceivably be attributed to lack of final enforcement. Whether
specific performance is actually implemented in the Civil Law
countries is the question to which we now turn. We investigate the
systems in Denmark, France and Germany.
3.1. Denmark
Danish contract law lays down that a party whose contractual rights
have been violated may choose between specific performance and
damages16. However, the Code of Procedure greatly diminishes the
number of cases for which specific performance will actually be
enforced by the legal system. The system is the following: If the court
orders the party in breach to perform as provided in the contract,
there are two possibilities. Either the defaulting party performs or he
does not. If he does not, the other party may choose to go to the
                                                                
16 The non-breaching party may make a cover purchase and will often be
recompensed under the damage measure.
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judicial enforcement agent (in Denmark he is called the foged, similar
to the bailiff in common law). What the foged must do is provided in
the Code of  Procedure17. It stipulates that except in a specified class
of cases, ‘the foged converts the plaintiff’s claim into money damages’
(Code of  Procedure §533 ). The specified set of cases §528-532  are
the following:
§528: where objects (already produced goods) simply need to be
handed over to the plaintiff, including where a person is to be given
access to real estate.
§529: where a good can be procured from a third party; the foged can
allow for a third party to perform and if the breaching party does not
pay for this, the foged can seize his assets.
§ 530: where the only act to be performed is a signature on a
document; the foged can sign for the defendant.
§ 531: where the act to be performed is the pledging of security; the
foged can seize assets from the breaching party and pledge these as
security.
§ 532: where the breaching party must be restrained from performing
certain acts that are harmful to the other party.
Thus, whenever the defendant must perform acts, and these acts
cannot be performed by a third party (a noteworthy exception), the
foged converts a claim of specific performance into money. As a
Danish foged said: "As soon as some act needs to be performed by the
defendant, we convert 18.
It should be added that the plaintiff can bring suit in a separate
criminal law case if the defendant has ‘willfully disobeyed a verdict of
specific performance’. However, this option is widely said never to
have been used.
                                                                
17 Law no. 469 (3 june 1993).
18 This interview was carried out by Ulrik Esbjørn, a student at Copenhagen Business School.
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3.2 Germany
The German Code of Civil Procedure is very similar to the Danish
code. As the general rule, the non-breaching party has the right to
claim specific performance. As in Danish (and French19) law, a basic
distinction is made between the situation when the seller should take
some positive action and when he just has to hand over the goods (see
Zweigert & Kötz 1998, pp. 470). In the latter case, there will be
enforcement if it can be done by the bailiff,  if necessary with the help
of the police, taking possession of the goods. In the former case a
further distinction is made whether or not the act could equally well
be performed by someone else (i.e. is ‘vertretbar’, see § 887 in the
Code of Civil Procedure, Zivilprocessordnung, ZPO). If substitute
performance is available (at reasonable cost, it may be added), a claim
for specific performance will not be executed, but the plaintiff may
make the cover purchase and the bailiff (the Gerichtsvollzieher) will
then execute the money claim in value equal to the cover purchase.
Thus, when substitute performance is available, the claim is
ultimately, if not already at the court-level20, converted to a money
claim. In commercial transactions, cover purchases seem from our
evidence frequently available, so this rule importantly limits the use of
specific performance in German contract law. The only major
difference between German and Danish law seems to lie in the
enforcement of performance when performance consists of acts that
can only (at reasonable cost) be performed by the seller himself, i.e.
acts that are, in the German expression, ‘unvertretbar’. Contrary to
Danish law, the breaching party can for such acts be threatened with
a fine or imprisonment if he refuses to deliver (§ 888 in ZPO). There
                                                                
19 It is a distinction which goes back to Roman law, see Dawson (1959).
20 The most likely outcome is that the non-breaching party makes a cover purchase
and sues for damages in the amount of the cover purchase which is then granted in
accordance with the rule of expectations damages.
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are, however, further exceptions: performance must not depend on the
seller’s inspiration or special effort21 but rather must have a more
routine character. Furthermore, § 888 describes some other situations
where the penal pressure is also not available, notably in employment
contracts22.
3.3 France
Although the Code Civil in France provides the right to claim specific
performance this principle is severely modified in Art. II42 which
prohibits any judgement which obliges the seller to act in a particular
way. The idea behind Art. II42 is that citizens are ‘free’ and should not
be forced into a certain course of action by the State. However,
according to Zweigert & Kötz (1998, p. 475), how far this principle is
carried in practice is unclear.
The French Code Civil makes a basic distinction between an
“obligation de faire” (to do) and an “obligation de donner” (to give), as
do the German and the Danish. The latter situation refers to the
situation where the seller simply has to deliver the goods to the buyer
while the former refers to the case where an act needs to be
performed. The case of ‘donner’ (giving) follows the same rules as in
Denmark and Germany. For the case of ‘faire’ the rules are formally
also quite similar to the Danish and German rules. Thus, the bailiff
can execute a money claim arising from a cover purchase. There is,
however, a difference in that French courts administer a special
system of fines (astreintes) which is paid from the breaching party to
the conforming party, if the breaching party chooses not to perform.
                                                                
21 This is often mentioned but according to Dawson no cases of this nature exist.
22 We have been unable to find out the extent to which the German bailiffs will
actually use coercive fines in such cases but we suppose that they will do so if the
plaintiff requires it, since the law is quite clear on this matter.
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However, Dawson (1959) called the whole French system non-sensical
due to the lack of effective enforcement.23
This is confirmed by Zweigert & Kötz’s conclusion (p.475): ‘’We may
sum up by saying that French law generally admits the issuance of
judgments for performance in kind but enforces them in a very
grudging manner’’.
3.4 Conclusion on Enforcement Systems
We may distinguish the following contractual duties:
a) duties to give (a further distinction can be made here between
things and human beings, the latter is relevant in child custody
cases).
b) duties not to do something.
c) duties to act when substitute performance is available.
d) duties to act when substitute performance is not available, as when
the parties have made important relationship-specific investments.
Concerning a) and b) the duties will often be specifically enforced in all
three countries.
Concerning c) specific performance may be enforced (or implemented)
but, in all three countries only when it is in the interest of both
parties. When substitute performance is available, specific
performance will not be enforced against the will of the breaching
party in any of the three countries.  On the other hand, when
substitute performance is readily available (what this means in
practice is unclear) it is generally the case that  the non-breaching
party can, in all three countries, make the cover purchase and be
reimbursed under the rule of expectation damages.
Concerning d), it seems that specific performance will be effectively
enforced only in Germany. In Denmark it will not be enforced at all
against the will of the breaching party while in France it will be
                                                                
23 He criticized the ineffectiveness of the use of ‘astreintes’, see p. 524-525.
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ineffectively enforced due to the ineffectiveness of the system of
‘astreintes’.
4. The Rationale For Not Enforcing Duties to Act
The account just given raises the question why duties to act are rarely
enforced. In France, one reason is clearly that coercing someone to act
in a specified way is seen as a restriction of his personal freedom,
which is out of proportion to the aim thereby advanced, as expressed
in Art. II42. The account below of the history of the Danish Civil Code
reveals a similar rationale and in Germany one finds the same
rationale both behind the rule that specific performance is not
enforced when substitute performance is available and behind the rule
that employment contracts are not specifically enforced.
4.1. A Brief History of the Danish Civil Code
The history of the Danish Code concerning enforcement of specific
performance is the following: The law of 1842 prescribed that if
the breaching party did not perform according to a court-decree
stating specific performance, he could be sanctioned to periodic
fines or imprisonment. The latter sanctions were abandoned as a
means of coercion in 1916. The motives for changing the Code of
Civil Procedure in 1916 states that one would not in the final
instance incarcerate a person in  consequence of his not meeting
a commercial contractual obligation24. It was argued that this
would be in conflict with fundamental principles of  modern
jurisprudence as well as violate a principle of proportionality25.
Finally, as a reason for changing the law, conversion of claims
                                                                
24 see Parliamentary Report (Betænkning) No. 1178 1989
25 The argument must be that if a person lacks assets, incarceration will be the only available instrument
for if a person has assets one would assume that he could be coerced through fines alone.
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was seen as administratively much easier and hence the method
actually employed in the overwhelming majority of cases.
In conclusion, when enforcement of specific enforcement has been
abandoned the reason is that costs have been seen as higher than
benefits. The benefits have been perceived to be simply the
difference in value for the plaintiff between specific performance
and a money claim, which may often not be very great. Forcing
people to act in a particular way requires a system of sanctions
that is both expensive to apply (periodic fines and perhaps
eventually imprisonment) and far-reaching for the individual.
Enforcing money claims, where seizure of assets is in itself
sufficient, is less costly.
5. Legal Scholars on the Use of Specific Performance
So far, the main conclusions are that claims for specific performance
seem very rare indeed according to our empirical material, and that
lack of enforcement can account for this in Denmark, partly (at least)
in France but not in Germany where enforcement seems to be in
place. This raises the question whether specific performance is also a
remedy that is rarely used in Germany. This would point to the
conclusion that lack of demand for specific performance is the
ultimate reason behind its rare use. Since our empirical material is
not directed at Germany in particular, we will instead consult the
writings of legal scholars who know the Civil Law systems well.
In legal, comparative, writings on contract breach, the view that
damages is the dominant form of relief also in Civil Law countries
seems quite universal. Thus, the Principles of European Contract Law
contain a section called ‘practical convergence’ (p. 400) where it is
plainly stated that:  ‘’The basic differences between common law and
Civil Law are of theoretical rather than practical importance’’.
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Dawson (1959), while stressing the difference between enforcement in
Germany and France, goes on to say that for the case of Germany
(p.530): ‘’despite formal limitations (on the right to sue for damages,
ed.) the damage remedy is in fact resorted to, by the choice of the
litigants, in a high percentage of cases, especially in sales of goods
and other commercial transactions’’.
On the other hand, in his book on ‘Rechtsverwirklung durch
Zwangsgeld’,  Oliver Remien discusses the German case-material. He
writes (our translation)26:
‘Fines are used as a means of coercion in many areas where
substitute performance is not possible’.
but the cases which he mentions do not generally involve production
contracts. They concern such cases as (p. 134): a company being
forced to render its accounts (a case from 1933) or to write up a
balance-sheet (1985) , or: the printing in a newspaper of a correction
(1986). However, Remien does mention two cases that involve
production contracts: One case from 1897 concerning the delivery of
electricity to a hotel and another case from 1985 concerning the
reparation of a computer by the deliverer.  Still, the impression
remains that specific performance is rarely used, especially in
commercial transactions.
The rare use of specific performance is directly stated by Kötz and
Zweigert (p. 484):
‘In Germany… where the claim to performance is regarded as the
primary legal remedy, it does not in practice have anything like the
significance originally attached to it, since whenever the failure to
receive the promised performance can be made good by the payment of
money commercial men prefer to claim damages rather than risk
                                                                
26 ‘’Das Zwangsgeld findet beit unvertretbaren Handlungen ein weites und
vielfältiges Anwendungsgebiet’’.
18
wasting time and money on a claim for performance whose execution
may not produce satisfactory results’.
This statement coincides with our conclusion27,28.
5. Why Do Businessmen Prefer Damages?
We can point to the following reasons:
1. When substitute performance is available it is often easier for the
non-breaching party to claim damages that can pay for substitute
performance than to claim specific performance that may lead to
the same result.
2. Quality of performance may be hard for the court to observe and
hence the non-breaching party can fear the quality of performance
if it is forced upon the breaching party.
3. The time it takes for the court system (with possible appeals, it
may take six years) to reach a verdict limits the value of ultimate
delivery. This strengthens the bargaining position of  the breaching
party. In general, he can impose costs on the other party which will
not all be recovered in the ultimate verdict.
4. The aggrieved party may fear that specific performance will be
made impossible by the breaching party before the time of the
verdict in which case the claim will anyway be converted into a
money claim.
                                                                
27 Another interpretation is that cases where specific investments are so important
that substitute performance is not available are rare. We do not think that they are,
although the number of CISG-cases which we found hat did visibly involve specific
investments was much smaller than we had anticipated.
28 According to Professor Møgelvang Hansen, who was member of an expert-
committee to investigate the Danish rules of civil procedure in the beginning of the
1990’s, the view that there is little demand for specific performance was an
important rationale for the committee not to suggest the reintroduction of fines in
Denmark as a means to coerce a party to perform.   
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5. Courts have difficulty writing down exactly what the required
performance involves (though the empirical evidence from the
construction contract cases where specific performance has been
enforced indicates that this difficulty is not prohibitive). Thus,
performance may not in the end be satisfactory.
There may be other reasons but the above would seem to go a long
way in explaining the lack of demand for specific performance29.
6. Implications for the Literature on Efficient Breach
and Renegotiation Design
Our analysis suggests that the existing literature on breach remedies
by abstracting from the problems and costs of enforcement have
missed an essential aspect in the comparison between specific
performance and damages30. It may of course be objected that the
economic literature studies the ideal system of specific performance;
that one could envisage a system in which specific performance would
be enforced by immediate, tough measures, e.g. without a right of
appeal or with heavy damages awarded for costs incurred by the non-
breaching party due to postponement of performance. Whether such a
system would actually be optimal is not clear, however. Coercion is
costly both administratively and to the party being coerced, and the
advantage which specific performance in some cases can hold over
                                                                
29 If this preference for damages was also present in older times, this would also
explain a fact noted by Dawson (1959) that in Roman law damages gradually
replaced specific performance.
30 The part of the existing literature which comes closest to addressing the concern
raised in this article, i.e. the cost and difficulty of enforcement, is the discussion
concerning the monitoring of quality of performance. Ulen (1984) recognizes that
quality of performance may be hard for courts to monitor, and that the breaching
party may hence under-perform as a reaction to being coerced, but he stresses that
this factor may be mitigated by the breaching party’s concern for reputation.
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expectation damages (when the value of performance is hard to verify)
may not outweigh these costs. In any event, it seems clear that  the
current literature, both that on breach remedies and that on contract
renegotation (e.g. Aghion, Dewatripont, Rey (1994)) is far from being
descriptively accurate of the present legal system of Civil Law
countries. In the real world, specific performance is far from being the
mechanism which the literature analyzes31.
Naturally, the case for damages rather than specific performance is
strengthened by the inclusion of enforcement costs. While a well-
functioning mechanism for enforcing damages exists, constructing one
for specific performance is harder. These difficulties, which a study of
the history of specific performance in Civil Law countries brings out
clearly, are given little attention in the models of renegotiation
design32.
7. The Difference Between Civil and Common Law
It follows from the empirical section that Civil Law and Common law
are not at all as different as sometimes imagined. Damages (often
anticipated in a cover purchase) is in practice the main remedy in
both systems. However, the analysis reveals that differences do exist,
although on a small scale. To illustrate one difference we can take the
case where the bailiff can order substitute performance if the
breaching party refuses to perform according to a court-decree. We
found that for the case of Denmark, in such cases the breaching party
may end up performing according to the contract even though this is
very costly to him. He may prefer this to a cover purchase that may be
                                                                
32 The present article relates to the debate on the methodological correctness of assuming incomplete
contracts where more elaborate mechanisms are theoretically available, see Maskin-Tirole (1999). That
even such a simple mechanism as specific performance turns out to be quite difficult and costly to
enforce in practice does not give promise to more elaborate mechanisms.
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even costlier, and renegotiation may not be feasible. We may hence
end up with the kind of case envisaged in the literature on efficient
breach where specific performance is socially costly. Some (Danish)
construction contract cases illustrate this possibility33.
However, the fact remains that very few such cases exist. Expectations
damages is by far the most prevalent remedy both in Civil and in
Common Law.
8. Conclusions
Our main points are the following:
1. Enforcement costs of various kinds are greater for specific
performance than for damages. It is more costly for authorities to
enforce specific performance, it is more costly in terms of violation
of individual freedom to coerce people into performing certain
actions, and it is more costly for the non-breaching party having to
wait for performance which may take years. The higher
administrative costs of specific performance and its higher degree
of coercion are factors that speak in favor of damages and against
the use of specific performance (while the cost to the non-breaching
party is hardly an argument against giving him the choice of
remedy).
2. The latter cost (to the non-breaching party) seems to be the most
fundamental in explaining the very limited use of specific
performance in Civil Law countries. Businessmen prefer damages
(not only ex-ante as stressed by in the theory of ‘efficient breach’
but also ex-post). It is our impression that the major reason for this
preference lies in the time it may take to obtain the goods or
services of the contract. Appeals may prolong the case, and this
                                                                
33 In construction contracts, performance may be delayed at little cost. Thus, the
breaching party cannot by threatening  to appeal very greatly lower the value of a
claim for specific performance.
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gives the breaching party a strong bargaining position since, in
reality, not all the costs hereby suffered by the non-breaching party
will be included in the final damages.
3. The first two kinds of costs (administrative difficulty and coercion
costs) explain why authorities are generally very reluctant to
enforce specific performance in both France and (especially)
Denmark. For the case of Germany it should be noted that specific
performance is enforced only when substitute performance is not
available and then only for some kinds of contracts (e.g. not for
employment contracts). In Denmark, enforcement of specific
performance was, broadly speaking, abandoned in 1916.
4. In the analysis of contract breach remedies, it is important to study
not only what the judge will state but also what the bailiff will
eventually do. In general, enforcement seems in practice to be more
difficult than envisaged both in the literature on breach remedies
and in the literature on renegotiation design. Enforcement is a
mechanism in itself and the rule of specific performance is not
well-defined unless the mechanism of enforcement is also specified.
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